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THEORIES OF MEASURING DAMAGES IN
SECURITY CASES AND THE EFFECTS OF
DAMAGES ON LIABILITY
THOMAS J. MULL4.VEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE measure of damages in securities fraud actions brought under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and its corollary,
rule 10b-5, 2 and under related provisions 3 has long been a neglected
stepchild of the securities laws. The specter of ruinous damages if cases
are tried to completion has often resulted in settlement of securities fraud
cases after the court's decision on the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint, or on the plaintiffs motion to certify the case as a class action, 4
thereby avoiding any decision on the measure of damages. Because there
have been comparatively few decisions on the measure of damages under
rule 10b-5, a consensus has been slow to develop. As one commentator
* Member of the bars of New York and Virginia. Mr. Mullaney received his B.A. from
Fordhan College, his J.D. from Virginia Law School, and his LL.M. from New York University
Law School, and is associated with the New York firm of Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell & Petty.
This Article was prepared in large part for a seminar entitled "Developing Issues of Securities
Regulation," taught by Professors Homer Kripke, Martin Lipton, and Kenneth J. Bialkin at New
York University Law School.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The section provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mals, or of any facility of any national securities exchange--
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." Id.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). The rule provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Id.
3. E.g., rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977) (prohibiting fraud in connection with proxy
statements).
4. The in terrorem effect of a securities fraud case was discussed in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-43 (1975).
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has noted, rule 10b-5 "has spawned many plaintiffs but few judgment
creditors." 5
This tendency to avoid a court determination of damages may be
about to change. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court 6 may encourage
defendants to litigate cases they might otherwise have settled, and
thereby produce more litigation on the issue of damages.7
The process of arriving at a proper measure of damages in securities
fraud cases is complicated by the fact that many of those cases are class
actions, in which it is alleged that a fraudulent statement has been widely
disseminated to a large group of people who relied on such statement to
their detriment. Such actions are brought by a representative plaintiff or
plaintiffs on behalf of others who are similarly situated, but neither the
representative party nor the class members need have had any direct
dealings with the defendants.
In computing damages in a class action case, it is seductively easy for
plaintiffs to prove the prices at which class members purchased and sold
(or sold and repurchased) their securities, and arrive at an aggregate
damage figure which represents the number of shares outstanding multi-
plied by the price range during the period of defendant's fraudulent
activity. However, such an approach takes no account of the seriousness
of the defendant's alleged fraud, or the market impact it may have had
from time to time, or the impact which it may have had on the trading of
particular class members. 8
In view of the large sums which may result from such sterile exercises in
multiplication, 9 courts have recently begfun to take two main approaches
5. Reder, Measuring Buyers' Damages in 10b-5 Cases, 31 Bus. Law. 1839, 1839 (1976).
6. Three major recent cases in which the Court declined to expand the scope of liability under
rule 10b-5 to cover the actions complained of are: Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
7. Another effect of the decisions referred to in note 6 supra may be to shift the locus of
securities fraud litigation from federal to state courts, where actions could be pursued under state
securities and fraud laws. State courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction under the 1934 Act
and therefore are not subject to the limitation contained in § 28 of that Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78bb (1970). See notes 17-21 infra and accompanying text. However, it is submitted that state
courts will be subject to the factors which have motivated the federal courts in this area. For
example, New York now has a class action procedure, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 901-909
(McKinney 1976), which is closely based upon Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If
state courts become the locus of future securities litigation, they will feel the same pressures as
federal courts have felt to charge defendants only with those losses which were proximately
caused by their actions. See generally Brodsky, Suing Brokerage Firms for Negligence Under
State Law (pts. 1-2) 178 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1977, at 1, col. 1, Sept. 21, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
8. The use of such a simplistic approach was cautioned against in Green v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring). See notes 99-103
infra and accompanying text.
9. The magnitude of potential damages was given as one reason for not imposing liability In
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
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to limit the impact of damages in the interest of justice. First, some
courts, with the help of expert witnesses, have undertaken a detailed,
technical analysis of securities prices, in an attempt to factor out those
losses which were attributable to market forces from those losses caused
by the defendants' conduct.1 0
Second, other courts have shown a tendency to be more cautious in
finding liability in those cases where damages will necessarily be large.
The damage issue may influence the court's decision on the adequacy
of plaintiff's claim,11 and may also affect the plaintiffs burden of
proof. 12
This Article will first consider the traditional rules used to measure
damages, 13 and then discuss the approaches courts have begun to take
to limit liability in the face of large potential damages.14
A. The Nature of the Problem
The basic problem with computing damages under rule 10b-5 is that
one is dealing with an implied remedy, under a rule which was drafted
to provide a basis for injunctive relief.15 The cases computing civil
damages under the rule have proceeded to apply judicial remedies in
the absence of legislative guidance. As a result, rule 10b-5 has been
described by the Supreme Court as "a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn. 16
In contrast to the explicit provision regarding damages for a mis-
statement in a registration statement under section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933,17 the subject is mentioned in the most general fashion in
10. See, e.g., Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), discussed at notes 6467
infra and accompanying text. See also Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10-5 Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 371, 389-98 (1974) (discussing an
"Abnormal Performance Index').
11. See Fidrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977),
discussed at notes 88-90 infra and accompanying text. See also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), discussed at notes 85-87 infra and
accompanying text.
12. See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
874 (1972).
13. See pt. II infra.
14. See pt. III infra.
15. See the discussion of the drafting of the rule in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 212 n.32 (1976). It is well settled, however, that an implied private right of action for
damages, as well as for injunctive relief, does exist under rule 10b-S. See Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631-33
(9th Cir. 1953); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See
also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
16. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) provides, in part: "[Damages] shall represent the difference
between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security was
19771
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section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which states:
"[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the pro-
visions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment
in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages
on account of the act complained of." 18 Courts have cited this general
provision in resolving a wide range of problems. Section 28(a) has been
held to bar punitive damages under the 1934 Act.1 9 The restriction to
"actual" damages has also been interpreted to prevent awards from
being based upon conjecture. Thus, the Supreme Court has cited
section 28(a) in support of the doctrine which limits the class of persons
protected under rule 10b-5 to actual purchasers and sellers of securi-
ties. 20 Section 28(a) has also been interpreted as restricting recovery to
the net losses on a particular transaction, thus barring a plaintiff from
keeping the profits and suing for the losses. 2 ' As will be shown, section
offered to the public) and (1) the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought, or (2) the
price at which such security shall have been disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price
at which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but before judgment if such damages
shall be less than the damages representing the difference between the amount paid for tie
security (not exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public) and the value
thereof as of the time such suit was brought: Provided, That if the defendant proves that any
portion or all of such damages represents other than the depreciation in value of such security
resulting from such part of the registration statement . . . not being true or omitting to state a
material fact . .. , such portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
19. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Hirsch & Lewis, Punitive Damage Awardt Under the Federal Securities Acts, 47
Notre Dame Law. 72 (1971); Note, Punitive Damages in Implied Private Actions for Fraud
Under the Securities Laws, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 646 (1970).
However, it has been held that punitive damages are available under a state law claim of
common law fraud which is pendent to a rule 10b-5 claim. See Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702,
706-07 (2d Cir. 1974) (dictum); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973); Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F. Supp. 616, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Comment, Punitive Damages and the Federal Securities Act: Recovery Via Pendent Jurisdiction,
47 Miss. L.J. 743 (1976).
20. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Mnor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Court reasoned:
"Section 28(a) .. . , which limits recovery in any private damages action brought under the 1934
Act to 'actual damages,' likewise provides some support tor the purchaser-seller rule. While the
damages suffered by purchasers and sellers pursuing a § 1((b) cause of action may on occasion be
difficult to ascertain, in the main such purchasers and sellers at least seek to base recovery on a
demonstrable number of shares traded. In contrast, a putative plaintiff, who neither purchases
nor sells securities but sues instead for intangible economic injury . . . is more likely to be seeking
a largely conjectural and speculative recovery in which the number of shares involved will
depend on the plaintiff's subjective hypothesis." Id. at 734-35 (citations omitted).
21. See Byrnes v. Falkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1313-14 (2d Cir. 1977). But
see Abrahamson v. Fleschner, [1976-1977 Transfer Binderl Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,889 (2d
Cir. Feb. 25, 1977); In re Clinton Oil Co., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,016 (D. Kan.
March 22, 1977).
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28(a) has not prevented courts from applying a variety of theories in
computing compensatory damages in rule 10b-5 cases.
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO MEASURING DAMAGES
A. The Basic Rule: Out-of-Pocket Damages
The basic rule on damages for a defrauded purchaser under rule
10b-5, which has been most favored by the courts, is the "out-of-
pocket" rule. Pursuant to this rule, the plaintiff will recover:
the difference between the contract price, or the price paid, and the real or actual
value at the date of the sale, together with such outlays as are attributable to the
defendant's conduct. Or in other words, the difference between the amount parted
with and the value of the thing received.
2 2
This rule is said to give the plaintiff his "actual damages" as mandated
by section 28(a) of the 1934 Act, without awarding him any profits he
might have expected to receive on the transaction. The question is "not
what the plaintiff might have gained, but what he has lost by being
deceived. '2 3 The plaintiff is therefore not entitled to "the expectant
fruits of an unrealized speculation. '24
The out-of-pocket rule is held to bar the application of a state's
"benefit of the bargain" rule.2 5 If the plaintiff fails to prove that there
was a difference between the price he paid and the value of the
security he purchased, his complaint is subject to dismissal. 26 Al-
though the out-of-pocket rule depends upon the valuation of the
security as of the transaction date, the best evidence of that value may
be the price of the security on a subsequent date, a short time after
proper disclosure has been made and the market is aware of the
22. Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d
527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
23. Id. Of course, the amount lost must have been paid because of the fraud and not some
supervening cause. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1051 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1977) (additional amounts paid because of bad legal
advice not recoverable).
24. 303 F.2d at 533 (citing Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125, 130 (1889))? This rule is derived
from the tort action of deceit. See Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Chaney v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1968). The
leading federal and New York cases on the out-of-pocket rule are collected in Berkowitz v.
Baron, 428 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
26. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634
(7th Cir. 1963). Moreover, it is considered to be reversible error in a jury charge to call the jury's
attention to a time period after the transaction date, during which the value of a security may
have risen, since the value is to be determined as of the transaction date. See, e.g, Investors
Thrift Corp. v. Sexton, 491 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1974).
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fraud. 27 In one case, sales made within two weeks after the transaction
in question were held to be "[t]he best evidence of the actual value of
the shares" at the date of plaintiffs' sale.28
In Harris v. American Investment Co. ,9 the plaintiff admitted that
he could not establish the actual value of his securities at the time of
his purchase. The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendant. The court of appeals reversed on the theory that, even if
the plaintiff could not prove by direct evidence the value of the
security as of the transaction date, he might be able to prove such
value by introducing evidence concerning the price after the public
discovery of defendant's fraud. 30 It should be noted that the significant
date for purposes of valuation was the date at which the public, rather
than the plaintiff, discovered the fraud, since it was the public's
discovery which corrected the market price and revealed the securities'
true value. 31
In picking the date of public disclosure, the Eighth Circuit in Harris
expressly disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Esplin v.
Hirschi,32 which upheld use of the date plaintiffs discovered the fraud
as the valuation date. In the Esplin case, the district court had
submitted special interrogatories to the jury asking them to ascertain
the value of the securities purchased by plaintiffs as of three different
dates: the date of plaintiffs' purchase, the date suit was filed and the
date of trial. The jury found that plaintiffs' damages were minimal as
of the date of their purchase, but as of the dates of suit and trial they
had lost the entire amount invested, $20,800. The district court then
disregarded the jury's verdict and fixed the value as of a fourth date,
the date when the plaintiffs received notice of the fraud. The court
computed plaintiffs' damages as $15,600 as of that date, precisely
three-quarters of the amount at issue. Despite the fact that this was the
fourth choice of the trial judge, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment and the proposition that the extent of plaintiffs' loss "may be
ascertained as of the date the purchaser realizes, or should realize, that
he has been defrauded. '33
27. Of course, the time period involved must not be too long, or irrelevant circumstances will
affect the price on the subsequent date.
28. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
29. 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
30. Id. at 227.
31. Id. at 226.
32. 402 F.2d 94, 104-O5 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
33. Id. The opinion was written by Judge Hill, who also wrote the opinions in Estate
Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.
1962), discussed at notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text, and Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), 405 U.S. 918 (1972), discussed at
notes 49-51 infra and accompanying text.
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This rule may have some application in cases like Esplin, where the
plaintiffs and defendants dealt face to face and the security in question
was not traded on any market. In that limited situation, the date
plaintiff learned of the fraud is the first date on which he can act to
protect himself or minimize his loss. However, in a case where a
security is traded on a public market, the date of public disclosure
should be the relevant date, for the reasons stated in the Harris case.Y
B. Out-of-Pocket Damages Phs Recovery
of Subsequent Profit
The out-of-pocket rule is subject to the variation that if a defendant
purchases a plaintiff's securities by fraud and subsequently enjoys a
profit, that profit, even if a windfall, should be recovered by the
plaintiff. The leading case on this variation is Janigan v. Taylor,35 in
which a director of a corporation had misrepresented the corporation's
prospects to his fellow directors and had purchased their shares.
Subsequent to the purchase, the corporation prospered to an extent
that was not foreseeable at the time of the purchase. The court
nevertheless found that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the full
value of defendant's profit on the ground that "[i]t is more appropriate
to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the
fraudulent party keep them." 36 The court acknowledged one situation
in which the full amount of the profit might not be recoverable:
There are, of course, limits to this principle. If an artist acquired paints by fraud and
used them in producing a valuable portrait we would not suggest that the defrauded
party would be entitled to the portrait, or to the proceeds of its sale. However, those
limits are not reached in the case at bar.37
This limitation has been narrowly construed and seldom applied in
securities fraud cases. In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,38 the court
found that shareholder approval of a merger had been procured by
fraud. The plaintiffs, who had surrendered their shares in the acquired
corporation, were held to be entitled to recover the profits earned by
34. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
35. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
36. Id. at 786. Of course, this assumes that the defrauded party would have retained the
securities and earned the profit, but for the fraud. Where the opposite can be shown, this measure
is inappropriate. Capital Inv., Inc. v. Bank of Sturgeon Bay, 430 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. 'WVis.
1977).
37. 344 F.2d at 787. A similar result was reached in Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968), wherein the defendants' efforts, in their capacity as
corporate management, in improving the corporation's prospects were completely disregarded by
the court. Both Janigan and Myzel were cited with approval, in dictum, in Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
38. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
1977]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the acquiring corporation as a result of its sale of the assets of the
acquired corporation within nine months of the merger. However, the
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the increase in the value of
certain other assets up to the time of judgment, which was a nine-year
period. In one case of excess administrative zeal, the Securities and
Exchange Commission demanded and got disgorgement of unearned
paper profits. 39
C. The Rescission Measure of Damages
Even where there has been no windfall profit, some courts have
applied a so-called rescission measure of damages where there is
privity of contract between the parties, and where strict rescission is
not possible because the security parted with no longer exists. Gould v.
American-Hawaiian Steamship CO.40 involved a merger transaction
where extra consideration amounting to approximately $8.25 per share
was paid to certain favored shareholders, chiefly the management of
the corporation to be acquired. The plaintiffs, who were the "non-
favored" shareholders, would have had no recovery under the "out-of-
pocket" rule, since they did not contend that the consideration which
they had received was worth less than the securities they had surren-
dered.4 1 Nor was this a situation like Janigan,42 where a fortuitous
profit had materialized. The court awarded the plaintiffs their pro rata
share in the premium that had been paid to the favored shareholders,
since that was the amount which "the plaintiff might have obtained by
renegotiation" if the fact of the premium had been disclosed. 4 3
The rescission measure of damages was defined in Gottlieb v.
Sandia American Corp.4 4 as follows: "According to this measure, if the
actual stock or assets which were orginally traded are no longer
available, damages will be awarded in the amount of the difference
between the present market value of the consideration originally given
and the consideration received. '45 In that case, the court first stated
that such a measure of damages could not be applied, since the
plaintiffs had surrendered their stock in a corporation which ceased to
exist as a result of a merger and whose value could not be determined
39. SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 7974).
40. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
41. Id. at 781.
42. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965), discussed at notes 35-37 supra
and accompanying text.
43. 535 F.2d at 783.
44. 304 F. Supp. 980(E.D. Pa. 1969), affrd in part, rev'dinpart, 452 F.2d 510(3d Cir.),cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971).
45. Id. at 990 (footnote omitted).
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as of the date of suit. Nevertheless, the court approximated the
rescission measure of damages by directing an evaluation of the shares
surrendered as of the date of the merger and adding 6% interest up to
the date of judgment, as an approximation of the present value which
those shares would have had.
46
Although there have been some cases where rescission was directed
against parties not in privity with the plaintiff,47 this remedy is
generally limited to those cases involving either privity between plain-
tiff and defendant or some specific fiduciary duty owed by brokers to
their customers, in order to provide some limitation on damages. 48
D. The Cover Remedy
The cover remedy, derived from the measure of damages for conver-
sion, has been applied in one leading case, Mitchell v. Texas GCulf
Sulphur Co. 49 The defendant corporation, which had made a rich ore
strike, put out a press release which falsely denied the rumors of the
ore strike. Subsequently, a second press release stated the true facts.
The plaintiffs in Mitchell had sold in reliance on the first fraudulent
press release. The Tenth Circuit applied a measure of damages derived
from the tort of conversion on the theory that plaintiffs had the
opportunity to repurchase their stock within a reasonable time after
learning the true facts:
We believe the measure of damages used should award the reasonable investor the
amount it would have taken him to invest in the TGS market within a reasonable
period of time after he became informed of the [corrective] April 16 release .... After
the reasonable stockholder had opportunity to apprise himself of the April 16 release
and its import to investment, a reasonable time lapse may be allowed to expire to
permit the investor to decide whether or not he would reinvest and take advantage of a
spiraling market. If he has failed to reinvest, as both Reynolds and Mitchell did, he
must suffer the consequences of his own judgment. The award proposed would permit
one to 'cover' by reinvestment and suffer neither loss nor forced sale.
The damages then should be based on the highest value of TGS stock between
Monday, April 20 and a reasonable time thereafter.5s
46. Id. at 991. A rescissory measure of damages was also applied in Malik v. Universal
Resources Corp., 425 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. Cal. 1976), an individual action under rule lOb-S where
the plaintiff was in privity with one of the defendants. The court noted that the plaintiff was also
entitled to rescission under California law. Id. at 364.
47. See, e.g., Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974).
48. As one commentator has noted, a broader application of the rescission measure of
damages (for example, to class actions), unrestricted by the requirement of privity, would cause
the financial ruin of numerous defendants. Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule lob-5 Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 371, 377 (1974).
49. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
50. Id. at 105.
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The court expressly adopted the cover remedy as an alternative to
rescission, since there had been no direct, personal dealings, no privity
between the parties, and no unjust enrichment.5t Cover was therefore
viewed as an alternative where the plaintiff is a defrauded seller, there
is no windfall profit to award him, and rescission is improper.
E. Damages Unrelated to Value: Churning
and Margin Violations
Churning and margin requirement violations by stockbrokers are
two specific areas where arbitrary rules of damages, which do not seek
to measure the value of the securities traded, have been created.5 2 In
cases of a churning violation, courts have awarded the plaintiff the
amount of the commissions and interest charges generated by the
wrongful activity.5 3 This measure has the theoretical effect of award-
ing a plaintiff some recovery, even if he has made a profit despite
being churned.5 4 On the other hand, plaintiffs who have suffered net
losses are not necessarily made whole by this rule. The rationale for
not replacing plaintiffs total losses (when losses result) appears to be
that the plaintiffs in these cases had some awareness of the trading in
their accounts and, moreover, assumed the risks of stock market
fluctuations.55
The complicity of the plaintiff was also the dominant reason for the
measure of damages set for a margin violation in Pearlstein v. Scudder
& German.5 6 There, the plaintiff had requested several extensions of
time to pay for securities purchased in his account. The Second Circuit
had previously found the broker liable for granting an illegal extension
of credit, rejecting contrary arguments based on the customer's fault,
51. Id. Of course, the analogy of the reasonable time for replacement may also be applied in
securities cases decided on a contract theory. See, e.g., Madison Fund, Inc. v. Charter Co., 427
F. Supp. 597, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.
1977).
52. "The 'churning' of a securities account occurs when a dealer, acting in his own interests
and against those of his customer, induces transactions in the customer's account which are
excessive in size and frequency in light of the character of the account." Note, Churning by
Securities Dealers, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1967). Section 7 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g
(1970), authorizes the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to regulate the amount
of credit a broker or dealer may extend or arrange to have extended to a customer, and makes
unlawful the violation of such regulations by a broker or dealer.
53. E.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 1970); Rolf v.
Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Stevens v. Abbott,
Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
54. See Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 849 (E.D. Va. 1968).
55. Id. at 850.
56. 527 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1975).
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and remanded for computation of damages.5 7 When the case next
came before the Second Circuit on the measure of damages question,
the court expressed some misgivings about its prior opinion and strictly
limited the broker's share of the market loss after an illegal extension
of credit to that proportion of the purchase price of the securities which
remained outstanding.5 8
It would appear that the churning and Pearlstein cases were decided
in this arbitrary fashion because there was some participation by the
plaintiffs in the defendants' wrongful activities and no deception as to
the value of particular securities. Therefore, such arbitrary measures
of damages are more appropriate here than they would be in the
typical securities fraud cases.
F. The Chasins Measure: A False Step
There are a few cases which hold a defendant responsible for
plaintiff's total economic loss. In Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co. ,9
the defendant had allegedly failed to reveal to the plaintiff that it was a
market maker in securities it recommended to him. The district court
awarded the plaintiff the full amount which he paid for the securities
in question, less the amount which he received when he sold those
securities. The court chose this measure of damages because of the
"absence of evidence as to the true value" of those securities. 60 In so
doing, it effectively removed the burden of proof of that value from the
plaintiff, who had failed to carry it, since he had been pursuing a
breach of contract theory.
In support of that measure of damages, the district court cited Sarlie
v. E. L. Bruce Co. 61 However, in Sarlie, the counterclaiming defen-
dants were awarded a default judgment against the plaintiff, who had
failed to appear for his deposition, thus rendering other methods of
computing damages impossible. Therefore, the plaintiff was not heard
to complain that he was held responsible for the full amount of money
lost by the defendants.
Barthe v. Rizzo62 was another case where plaintiff was awarded his
entire loss. There, a defendant induced a plaintiff to enter into a
57. 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
58. 527 F.2d at 1146 n.7. A recent opinion by Judge Pollack has refused to permit an implied
right of action under Regulation T in a case involving option transactions where the customers
were fully aware of the activity in their account. Drasner v. Thompson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 433
F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
59. 305 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
60. Id. at 496.
61. 265 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), cited in 305 F. Supp. at 496.
62. 384 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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venture capital deal wherein, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the defen-
dant had almost all of the equity ownership. The plaintiff was given
debentures, but very little equity, for his investment. The entire
investment rapidly collapsed. The court awarded plaintiff, as dam-
ages, the entire amount which he had invested, on the theory that he
might never have invested at all had he known the true facts. Given
the facts of the case, this measure of damages is probably not different
from the result which would have been obtained under the out-of-
pocket rule, since it appears that the investment in question was
worthless from the very beginning.
It is submitted that the Chasins result is an aberration, caused by
the fact that the district court imposed a different theory on the case
than the one plaintiff tried to prove; the Sarlie result was a penalty for
failure to comply with discovery; and the Barthe result can be har-
monized with the out-of-pocket rule. There is no precedent for award-
ing plaintiff his entire loss, without asking whether defendant caused
that entire loss.
III. RECENT TRENDS IN MEASURING DAMAGES
A. Use of Indexes and Sophisticated Value Computations
In awarding damages for securities fraud, courts have recently
shown an increased willingness to apply formulas derived from ex-
perts' analyses of trading patterns. Such experts have not restricted
themselves to a fundamental analysis of value, such as an examination
of the earnings of the corporation in question by plaintiff's expert, 63
but have shown a willingness to consider highly technical analyses of
trading patterns.
In Bonime v. Doyle,64 the court analyzed the reasonableness of a
proposed settlement of a class action involving alleged manipulations
and fraudulent statements concerning the stock of Canadian Javelin
Ltd. The court adopted an analysis by Dr. Roger F. Murray of
Columbia University, who studied the trading in the stock. Dr.
Murray's analysis attempted to do two things; first, to factor out those
"losses attributable to general market forces" from those losses which
were unique to Canadian Javelin (and presumably caused by defen-
dants' fraud), and second, to separate the losses suffered by short-term
speculators from those losses suffered by longer-term investors who,
presumably, relied on defendants' statements. 65
63. This was the method of proof demanded by the court in Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F.
Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
64. 416 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
65. Id. at 1377. Dr. Murray first compared the prices of Canadian Javelin stock over the
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The court expressly found that it was not possible to compute a
value figure as of the purchase date, and that to consider the price of
the stock after corrective disclosure would disregard "the many other
factors which influence price fluctuation over time" and would indem-
nify the plaintiffs against "the risks of the vicissitudes of the mar-
ket."'66 This was especially true, since the time period of the alleged
non-disclosure in the Bonime case covered four years, from 1969 to
1973, which the court described as "perhaps the most disastrous period
in the post-1929 history of the stock market. '67
The court in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipinent Corp.,
68
considered a decline in the Standard & Poor's Daily Stock Price Index
in reducing the proportion of the trading losses which it awarded to the
plaintiffs. 69 The operative facts in the case occurred during the early
portion of the same market slump as those in Bonime. The Feit case is
more remarkable, however, because it was brought under section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933, 7 0 and the court found that the Standard &
Poor's index satisfied the defendants' statutory burden of proof that a
portion of the decline in price of the securities was "other than the
depreciation in value . . . resulting from . . . [the false] registration
statement. ' 71 The Feit opinion has been criticized for its "reference to
a broad-based index"72 rather than to a particular index more closely
related to the type of security involved. 7 3
A technical analysis of value was also made in the most recent
opinion in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 74 In evaluating the fairness
of the terms of a merger that had been procured by a misleading proxy
period in question to two comparable indexes of stock groups and found that Canadian Javelin's
prices did not differ in any material respect from the indexes selected. Id. However, he then
noted that during three periods in which there was great activity in Canadian Javelin stock, those
who purchased the stock would have been unable to sell it before it declined in price and
therefore suffered the loss of "activity premiums." Id. at 1378. From a study of the transfer
agent's records he determined how many of those who purchased during the periods of excessive
activity were short term traders and he subtracted their losses from the total loss. He was then
left with a total which was intended to reflect the losses of those who were buying Canadian
Javelin with reference to expected developments, and not simply to take advantage of a quick
price change. Id.
66. Id. at 1384.
67. Id. at 1385.
68. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
69. Id. at 586.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
71. 332 F. Supp. at 586 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970)).
72. Reder, Measuring Buyers' Damages in Ob-5 Cases, 31 Bus. Law. 1839. 1850 (1976).
73. Professor Murray's analysis in the Bonnie case was based on two such particular indexes.
416 F. Supp. at 1377.
74. 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977).
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statement, the district court had found that the market value of each
corporation's stock was not a reliable criterion and had relied instead
on earnings and book value." The Seventh Circuit, however, found
that the market price during the six months before the merger was the
correct indicator of value despite certain inter-company purchases of
stock:
We hold that when market value is available and reliable, other factors should not be
utilized in determining whether the terms of a merger were fair. Although criteria such
as earnings and book value are an indication of actual worth, they are only secondary
indicia.... If we were to independently assess criteria other than market value in our
effort to determine whether the merger terms were fair, we would be substituting our
abstract judgment for that of the market. Aside from the problems that would arise in
deciding how much weight to give each criterion, such a method would be econom-
ically unsound.
76
The court then applied the analysis of two commentators 77 in
requiring that minority shareholders be compensated for their share of
the "synergistic effect" created by the merger.7 8 The court found that
the minority shareholders had received more than their fair share of
the value of the resulting corporation and that plaintiffs should recover
no damages. 79
Although the facts and analyses 'in the preceding three cases differ
widely, in each case a court has shown a willingness to go through a
technical analysis of price information to give plaintiffs only that
portion of any loss which was directly caused by defendants' conduct.
B. The Effect of the Amount of Damages
on Findings of Liability
The measure of damages undoubtedly has an effect on a court's
determination of liability. As was stated in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche,8 0 a court would hesitate to impose liability if the resulting
hazards to legitimate businesses would be "so extreme as to enkindle
doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that
75. Id. at 1244.
76. Id. at 124748 (footnote omitted).
77. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 297, 313-25 (1974).
78. 552 F.2d at 1248.
79. Id. at 1249. In addition, the court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover
attorneys' fees and other expenses for the trial and appeals on the issue of damages, in the absence
of any benefit conferred on a class of shareholders (or bad faith on the part of the defendants). Id.
at 1249-50. The Supreme Court had earlier held that the Mills plaintiffs were entitled to recover
attorneys' fees and other expenses for the trial and appeals on the issue of liability,' because all
shareholders had benefited from this form of "corporate therapeutics." 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970)
(quoting Murphy v. North Am. Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)).
80. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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exposes to these consequences."'I This issue often arises in securities
fraud cases, where thousands of shareholders may be involved.
As discussed above, courts have hesitated to impose a rescissory
measure of damages on defendants in cases where that would involve a
ruinous burden.8 2 In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,83 the court
imposed rescissory damages for a violation of the proxy rules, but
noted that the class of plaintiffs was limited to those in privity, that is,
to those stockholders whose proxies were solicited. "While 'privity' is
not required for most actions under the securities laws, its existence
may bear heavily on the appropriate standard of culpability. '8 4
The Second Circuit showed some sensitivity to the burden to be
imposed on the defendants in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,85 although it refused to limit liability to those
defendants who were in privity with the plaintiffs.8 6 The court stated:
Other questions bearing upon the appropriate form of relief which must await trial
include the extent of the selling defendants' trading in Douglas stock, whether such
trading effectively impaired the integrity of the market, what compensation if any was
paid by the selling defendants to Merrill Lynch for the inside information, what profits
or other benefits were realized by defendants, what expenses were incurred and what
losses were sustained by plaintiffs, and what should be the difference, if any, in the
extent of liability imposed on the individual defendants and the selling defendants,
respectively. Moreover, we do not foreclose the possibility that an analysis by the
district court of the nature and character of the rule 10b-5 violations committed may
require limiting the extent of liability imposed on either class of defendants.
8 7
In a decision which is in conflict with the Shapiro case, the Sixth
Circuit declined to find liability against a broker-dealer who purchased
stock in the open market based upon favorable inside information. In
Fridrich v. Bradford,8 8 plaintiffs who had sold in the open market at
or about the time of defendants' purchases, sued for the full amount of
the gain they would have had if they had not sold. The court of
appeals reversed the district court's finding of liability, stating that a
finding of liability "would present a situation wholly lacking in the
natural limitations on damages present in cases dealing with face-to-
face transactions. '8 9 It cited the potential liability of one of the
81. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
82. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
83. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
84. Id. at 1300 (citing Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of
Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 423, 437 (1968)).
85. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
86. Id. at 239; ef. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), affrd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (requiring a "semblance of privity').
87. 495 F.2d at 242.
88. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
89. Id. at 321.
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individual defendants in that case as an illustration of the dangers
posed; his profit, which he had already disgorged, amounted to
$13,000 and the holding of the district court might produce damages in
excess of $7,000,000, if the case had been a class action. 90
In Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 9t a Third Circuit deci-
sion, the court noted that the size of the plaintiff class, and the
resulting potential damages, may actually influence the standard of
proof:
Where only one or a few parties are suing to recover, courts may well reach a different
result from that when suit is brought on behalf of thousands of shareholders. . . It is
fitting that in the face-to-face confrontations, courts should impose a higher standard
of disclosure by lessening the degree of culpability upon which liability can be
imposed. From a practical standpoint, in such situations, the amount of damages is
relatively finite, whereas in a suit on behalf of a class composed of thousands of
shareholders, damages might well extend into millions of dollars. When faced with
such huge potential payments .... , the courts seem to have proceeded more slowly, by
requiring that the plaintiff class prove conduct closer to the traditional concepts of
actionable fraud. 92
In order to take advantage of the effects of damages on liability,
defendants must be sure both issues are presented together. Professor
Ruder has pointed out the dangers to defendants of separating issues of
damages from those of liability in a "bifurcated trial," noting that "the
possibility that damages may be dramatic in amount may be the most
important factor in determining whether liability should be imposed at
all."93
In some cases, the amount of damages to be awarded has had a
direct result on the class action determination under Federal Rule 23. 94
In Blackie v. Barrack, 95 a class action was brought on behalf of the
open market purchasers of Ampex securities over a two year period,
charging that the annual reports and other documents published by
Ampex had inflated the corporation's earnings. One of the arguments
made by the defendants in opposition to class certification was that
each purchaser would be interested in maximizing the effects of the
fraud at the time he purchased his securities, thereby minimizing the
extent of damages at other times in the two-year class period. 96 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that it depended entirely
90. Id. at 321 n.29.
91. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
92. Id. at 286.
93. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5
Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 423, 427 (1968) (footnote omitted).
94. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
95. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
96. Id. at 908.
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upon the adoption of the out-of-pocket measure of damages. 97 The
court stated that it is "within the discretion of the district judge in
appropriate circumstances to apply a rescissory measure." 98
The Blackie dictum on measure of damages is in sharp contrast to a
concurring opinion in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. ,99 which
was also a Ninth Circuit decision. There, the court, on a mandamus
petition, decided that it had not been an abuse of discretion for the
district court to certify a class under Federal Rule 23(b)(3). As in
Blackie, the complaint alleged that the corporate defendant had issued
false press releases and reports to shareholders over the course of
several years, which had artificially inflated the market price of its
securities. In his concurring opinion, Judge Sneed (who had not been
on the panel which decided Blackie) agreed that it was not an abuse of
discretion to allow class status, but only on the presupposition that the
"out-of-pocket" rule be used in computing damages.1 00 Since there
were no face-to-face dealings between the parties, the purchasers' total
economic "losses" were not equivalent to the defendants' "gains."
Therefore, he concluded that the rescissory measure would not prop-
erly measure the amount of the losses caused by the defendants:
The rescissory measure of damages does not properly measure that loss. The reason is
that it permits a defrauded purchaser to place upon the defendant the burden of any
decline in the value of the stock between the date of purchase and the date of
disclosure of the fraud even though only a portion of that decline may have been
proximately caused by the defendant's wrong. The other portion is the result of market
forces unrelated to the wrong. Moreover, this decline is unrelated both to any benefits
derived by the defendant from his fraud and to the blameworthiness of his conduct.10 1
Judge Sneed stated that plaintiff would have to establish a "price
line" and a "value line" over the time period of the alleged manipula-
tion, in order to show the difference, if any, between the price and the
true value of the securities involved as of the date of purchase by any
class member.- He pointed out that the difference between the price
and value lines would not necessarily remain constant during the entire
period. He gave the example that, if a defendant falsely stated that it
had discovered a quantity of oil, the difference between the price and
value of its securities might well vary in accordance with the rise and
fall of the price of oil, until the false disclosure was corrected.1 0 2 He
acknowledged that this method was more complicated than simply
permitting plaintiffs to prove their purchase and sale prices and collect
97. Id.
98. Id. at 909.
99. 541 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 1344 (Sneed, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 1342 (Sneed, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 1345 (Sneed, J., concurring).
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the differences. However, he stated that the wrongdoing defendants
"should not be mulcted to make simple the management of a class
proceeding under Rule 10b-5." 0 3
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has attempted to show that the computa-
tion of damages for securities fraud is not a simple task, nor are the
rules which have evolved easy to apply with scientific precision.
Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from these cases is
that courts are beginning to appreciate the difficulties of computing a
fair measure of damages and arriving at a fair overall result. The days
may be over when a circuit court of appeals can make the overly facile
suggestion that an award of rescissory damages is "within the discre-
tion of the district judge" in, for example, a class action involving open
market purchases over a two year period, with no privity between
plaintiffs and defendants.10 4
Courts have been willing to consider whether part of the economic
loss in a given transaction was caused by the plaintiff's complicity or
by factors, such as market fluctuations, beyond the control of either
party. Particularly in class actions, courts have stopped to consider
whether there should be some relationship between the degree of a
defendant's fault and the impact of a class judgment against him. The
Second Circuit in Shapiro 10 5 put forth a rather disjointed list of factors
which might influence a district court, but the mere existence of such a
list is some indication of a desire to have any ultimate damage award
somehow correspond to the degree of culpability of the defendants.
As was shown by the Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.10 6 litigation,
the courts' function does not end with a finding of liability; the most
difficult task yet may be the computation of damages. The ultimate
goal, a fair overall result, should be pursued at all stages of a case,
from the motion to dismiss the pleadings, to the class action motion, to
the decision on liability, and, lastly, to the computation of damages.
The computation of damages should not be neglected; it is a court's
last chance to do justice.
103. Id. at 1343 (Sneed, J., concurring).
104. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975).
105. 495 F.2d 228, 242 (2d Cir. 1974), discussed at note 87 supra and accompanying text.
106. 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977).
